



*International order in the Post Cold  
War Europe. Elements of stability,  
continuity and change*

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# ***International Order in the Post Cold War Europe. Elements of Stability, Continuity and Change<sup>1</sup>***

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## **Introduction**

After a decade since the end of the Cold War, the international order in Europe is still in the process of formation. Its transparency and unequivocalness characteristic of the Cold War have gone. At that time, bipolarity prevailed on the military-political and ideological levels of international order. The institutional ties characteristic of that order were defined by a "three-field" system comprising the countries belonging to NATO, the EEC and the Council of Europe, Warsaw Pact and Comecon countries, and neutral or non-involved states. An important factor determining the structure and functioning of international order in Europe was the presence of the superpowers, one from another continent (the United States), and the other only partly rooted in Europe (the USSR). Their presence had a limiting effect on the international subjectivity of Europe and its political identity.

Paradoxically, the present order, despite its radical change, continues to develop through preservation and adaptation of numerous elements of the former order, particularly in the domain of institutional ties. New structures and mechanisms are also emerging. Thus, the process of its formation involves change combined continuity and search for stability. Perhaps that is why the formation of a new order has not been completed yet. Nonetheless, it constitutes the premises for its future durability and stability.

An analysis of international order in the post Cold War Europe requires a definition of its fundamental elements. It is also necessary, in my opinion, to overcome the existing traditions of the state-centric conceptions of international order and to take into account non-governmental actors. Thus, international order in Europe can be considered as a two-level structure consisting of the "realm of states" and the "realm of non-governmental actors". On the level of states, international order in Europe is determined primarily by values, norms, codes of conduct, and institutional ties.

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## **I. The concepts of international order and stability.**

Although the phenomenon of international order has been the subject of intensive studies, its definitions are hard to come by. For centuries, many philosophers and thinkers regarded order as a value. It has been identified as the opposite of chaos, anarchy, disorder or spontaneity. In positive terms, it has been identified with regularity, inner coherence and balance.<sup>2</sup>

The above understanding of the concept of "order" is evidently associated with its colloquial positive understanding. However, for the purposes of scholarly analysis a "neutral" definition is necessary. It ought to be identified with a set of structures, mechanisms, distribution of power, actors and their interests, values, etc, defining the form and functioning of international environment at any given time. In this sense, what is commonly regarded as disorder or chaos also constitutes a kind of international order.

It is important to identify the phenomena and processes determining the substance of international order at any given time, i.e. its constitutive elements. J. Kukułka includes among them the degree of institutionalization of international environment, preferred international values, especially by the main participants, the structure of interests and goals of particular countries<sup>3</sup>, especially the superpowers. An additional element is the polarity of international environment, or the existing distribution of power.

J. Kukułka argued that each type of order is utilitarian in nature, i.e. it protects a given status quo.<sup>4</sup> During the Cold War, it was the so-called Yalta-Potsdam order with its own political-territorial status quo. Is this understanding of the concept applicable to the post-Cold War period? Obviously not. Then what would the utilitarian character of the emerging international order in Europe consist in? It seems that the principal value protected in terms of this order, and by this order, is the stability of international environment, that is, its higher predictability. In other words, status quo is clearly identified with the idea of stability, often used interchangeably with the concept of international security.

This thesis seems to be confirmed by documents adopted by the main international organizations in Europe. On the one hand, they constitute a kind of "soft law", and on the other, they reflect the awareness of political forces and decision-makers in particular countries.

The idea of stability seems to have become a permanent feature of both the thought processes and the actions undertaken by the CSCE/OSCE after the end of the Cold War. A vision of peaceful and stable Europe was delineated already in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted in November 1990.<sup>5</sup> In the documents of the

Helsinki Summit in July 1992, it was declared that the participating countries aim at "the strengthening of security and stability".<sup>6</sup> The Lisbon Declaration of December 1996 emphasized that "a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe" was adopted "to strengthen security and stability throughout the OSCE region".<sup>7</sup>

The problem of stability and stabilization appears in the Charter for European security adopted during the Istanbul Summit in November 1999. Stability is considered here as a value to be protected by a variety of means envisioned in the document such as protection of human rights, including the rights of national minorities, development of confidence-building measures, implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990, activities of international organizations, democratization of social and political life in particular countries.<sup>8</sup>

The idea of stability has become a permanent feature of NATO's ways of thinking and modes of action since the early 1990s. The documents adopted at the Rome Summit in November 1991 emphasized the role of the Alliance in maintaining stability and safeguarding the security of its members. The Alliance's new strategic concept, formulated in a radically different situation in Europe, would allow full implementation of the broad approach to stability and security.<sup>9</sup> At the Washington Summit in April 1999, it was pointed out that the Alliance strongly supported new models of cooperation and mutual understanding in the Euro-Atlantic area and pledged to undertake new initiatives aimed at strengthening security and stability. It was emphasized that NATO was not only committed to collective defense of its members but also to enhancing Euro-Atlantic peace and stability.<sup>10</sup>

Since the 1990s the problem of the stability and stabilization of international environment has also been present in the political thought and action of the European Union. At the Lisbon European Council in June 1992, it was declared that the aim of the then adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy was to support the political stability in the region.<sup>11</sup> The idea of stability was emphasized even more during the European Council meeting in Cannes in June 1995 devoted to the Mediterranean policy of the European Union. The adopted documents explicitly declared that the principal goals with regard to the region were stability and prosperity. Elsewhere in the same documents it was pointed out that "peace and stability of the Mediterranean Basin constitute a common asset".<sup>12</sup>

For the European Union, stability has become not only an element of political thought but also of concrete diplomatic initiatives. In 1995, on French initiative, the Stability Pact was signed, whose aim was to stabilize the borders in Central and Eastern Europe and prevent the situation in which ethnic problems might cause demands for their revision. In June 1999, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe was adopted at the Cologne European Council Summit. The pact forms the basis of multidimensional activities, including economic aid, aimed at stabilizing the Balkan situation after the completion of NATO's operation in Kosovo.

Stability is also one of the fundamental values underlying the actions undertaken by the Council of Europe. In the nineties the European Council worked out a conception of democratic security and stability, even earlier than the European Union. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Stability Programme for South Eastern Europe in May 1999.<sup>13</sup>

The above examples clearly demonstrate that the question of stability occupies a central position in the action plans of the OSCE, NATO, the European Union, and the Council of Europe, organizations that are of fundamental importance for the post Cold War order on the old continent. Stability is a commonly accepted value and a source of directives for practical action.

Although the problem of stability has been present in studies of international relations, a commonly accepted definition of the concept does not exist. Two different definitions of this concept predominate in the existing studies.

The first associates stability with a social process taking place in the international environment. O. Young identifies stability with the persistence of variables essential for a given international system and associates it with the status quo.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, Q. Wright emphasizes the "dynamic" conception of stability. For him, stability does not consist in the absence of change but in the absence of sudden change.<sup>15</sup> This means that processes of gradual changes in an essentially dynamic international environment do not preclude its stability.

Another approach to the definition of security associates it with a particular kind of conditions and properties of the international environment, especially with the absence of war. T. Schelling argues that stability denotes a low probability of an outbreak of war.<sup>16</sup>

The above tendencies in defining the concept of stability associate it not only with continuity but also with gradual change in the international environment. They also concentrate on the presence or absence of certain interactions, especially the absence of war.

The above conceptions of stability were formulated during the Cold War period. At present, they prove of little use in the radically altered international environment, deepening interdependencies, dynamics and changeability. The present situation demands the identification of stability with the organization of international environment by means of appropriate structures and mechanisms. In terms of this conception, stability is closely bound with the process of formation of the post Cold War international order in Europe. Stability

is evidently one of the objectives of the functioning of that order and denotes the ability of European countries to control the “natural” instabilities and the changeability of international environment.

## **II. The interstate level**

On the interstate level, common political values, consensually adopted norms of conduct, and institutional ties forming five complimentary “areas” are among the most significant stability factors in the emerging international order in the post Cold War Europe. However, we shall pass over the problem of the distribution of power in the post Cold War Europe, understood as an essential part of its structure and the existing international order, since this factor is analyzed mainly in connection with the global international order.

### **1. Common values**

The division of Europe in the Cold War period was based on certain values. Thus the process of European unification began with a list of common values around which the process of the intrastate “organization” of European countries was taking place in order to attain at least a minimum of cohesion. The first important step in this direction was made during the Paris Summit of the CSCE. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe emphasized such values as democracy, economic liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights, including national minority rights, and environmental responsibility.<sup>17</sup> They were accepted by all European countries participating in the conference.

In comparison with the Cold War period, the new situation is qualitatively different and constitutes an element of change in the international order in Europe. At the same time, the change forms the premises for enhancing stability. Common political values restrict the danger of ideological confrontation. Moreover, in a situation when the internal affairs of a state are at present the main cause of undermining the stability of the international environment<sup>18</sup>, its homogeneity, “organized” around common values, increases the predictability of actions of particular states and the stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The European Union is clearly aware of the importance of this mechanism and the usefulness of common values in the process of stabilizing the international environment, although the stability of the EU is beyond doubt. Thus, Art. F of the Amsterdam Treaty declares

that the Union is built on such values as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental liberties, and rule of law.

NATO's decision to intervene in the New Yugoslavia in the name of defending the Kosovo Albanians against discrimination the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague to accuse a ruling head of state (S. Milosevic) of war crimes, clearly demonstrate that the above values are not a passing phenomenon, but a permanent element of the international order in Europe, capable of initiating joint action in their defense.

Protection of human rights acquires special significance for the maintenance of the international order in the post Cold War Europe and its stability. It becomes the key element of the European political identity and clearly gains priority over the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. It was decided that violation of human rights can destabilize the international environment, and so the guilty countries cannot appeal to the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs.

However, the unification of values in Europe applies to the political level and is an important factor in deepening the cohesion of Europe and the processes of integration. On the cultural level Europe needs to preserve the diversity connected with the preservation of national identity and uniqueness. Cultural diversity in a situation of unification and political stability constitutes the premises for enriching cultural dialogue between particular nations and ethnic groups.

## **2. Norms of conduct**

The significance of consensually accepted norms as an element of order in the Euro-Atlantic area and a premise of its stability, was recognized already during the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 contained 10 principles regulating the co-existence of the two opposed military and political blocs. In the political sense, these principles, of which seven are derived from the United Nations Charter and three (inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and respect for human rights) were negotiated in the mid-seventies, have been binding on European countries to this day. Apart from documents establishing a kind of "soft law", binding in the political sense, international legal regulations have appeared, which can be regarded as "classic" international regimes.

The first set of regulations includes the provisions concerning security- and confidence-building measures, documents of the CSCE/OSCE review conferences, the CSCE regulations concerning human rights (1990 and 1991), or the Code of Conduct on Politico-

Military Aspects of Security adopted during the Budapest Summit in 1994.

The mechanism of continuity and change characterizes the development of security and confidence-building measures. Its first elements were contained in the Helsinki Final Act and then expanded in the CSCE Stockholm Document of 1986. After the end of the Cold War, they were detailed in the Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992, and 1994.<sup>19</sup> The latest one enumerates such measures as an annual exchange of military information, including defense planning and military expenditure, prior notification of certain military activities such as maneuvers or troop movements, observation of certain military activities, Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings, etc.<sup>20</sup>

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security has been negotiated in the 1990s. It takes into account the new international situation and, in comparison to the "first basket" of the Helsinki Final Act, is an element of change. It contains such directives and principles of conduct as indivisibility of security, co-operative strengthening of security, refusal to support any states that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against any state, democratic political control of military forces, transparency of military activities, refraining from imposing military domination over any other state, rejection of terrorist acts and combating the threat of terrorist activities.<sup>21</sup>

Among the legally binding regulations, essential for the stability of the international environment and defining the norms of conduct of European countries, are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990 and the Treaty on Open Skies signed in 1992.<sup>22</sup> The former imposed limitations on conventional, especially offensive, weapons upon the participating countries. The latter introduced observation flights as an instrument of verification of the implementation of the treaty in the area from San Francisco to Vladivostok.

Both treaties are examples of international regimes, whose intensive development can be observed in the post Cold War Europe. They are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.<sup>23</sup> An important feature of regimes defined in this way is the legal regulation underlying them and their association with international organizations monitoring the process of their implementation. In the case of the above-mentioned conventions, the supervising role is played by the OSCE. Thus, regimes are provided with special verification procedures of the implementation of the adopted regulations.



International regimes defined in this way are an essential element of the international order in the post Cold War Europe and a major stability factor in the Euro-Atlantic area. They realize their function by 1) improved communication among states, which reduces the risk of misinterpreting the intentions and conduct of other states; 2) increasing the predictability of behavior as a result of narrowing "the field of the game" to the consensually agreed limits; 3) turning the processes of interaction into a recurrent game opens the possibility of applying the reciprocity principle.<sup>24</sup> As a result, regimes tend to eliminate the use of force in solving disputes between states, replacing it with an institutionalized, collective solving of conflicts of interest. According to B. Buzan, this leads to the state of "mature anarchy" of the decentralized international environment.<sup>25</sup>

### **3. Institutional ties**

The degree of institutionalization is an essential element in characterizing the international order in the post Cold War Europe and a premise of its stability. The area is characterized by symmetry of institutional ties. Taking as our point of reference the established formalized structures in the form of international organizations, five areas of institutional ties in Europe can be distinguished: the transatlantic area, the Western European area, the Central European area, the area of the Community of Independent States, and the OSCE area.

**a) The transatlantic area.** Based on the North Atlantic Alliance, it emphasizes the American involvement in European security. The Alliance, founded on common political and cultural values, has consolidated during the Cold War. Fear of the former USSR was an important factor conducive to the coherence of the Alliance.

Common political values are an important binding factor of the transatlantic area. The preamble to the Washington Treaty of 1949 refers to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, well-being, and stability. Common values turn this area into a security-community. On the other hand, Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that America and Europe, which together constitute the axis of global stability, are the driving force of global economy and the center where intellectual capital converges with technological progress.<sup>26</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic area has undergone important changes. Nevertheless, the countries involved are convinced of the continuing need of the American presence in Europe. The main motive is European stability, proper arrangement and predictability of the European order, and maintenance of the balance of power, so as to prevent the disturbance of order by any

European state. The fact that the American presence in Europe strengthens America's status as a global superpower is important for the United States.<sup>27</sup>

The transatlantic area, and especially NATO, must adapt to new realities of the international environment.<sup>28</sup> First of all, there is an obvious need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to increase the responsibility of Western European states for their own security. An important step in this direction is the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. This tendency is supported by countries on both sides of the Atlantic. However, this cannot lead to the weakening of transatlantic ties. It is necessary to develop both the Western European integration and the transatlantic ties, which are of fundamental importance for NATO's credibility and the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The security of Europe and North America is indivisible. Thus, there is a combination of elements of continuity and change, in the form of the strengthening of NATO's European pillar.

The process of NATO's adaptation to the new realities of the international environment is far more complex. First of all, it includes dialogue and "building bridges" to Central and Eastern Europe. This is based on the formula of dialogue-cooperation-necessary defense potential introduced in Harmel's Report of 1967. Dialogue and cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries assume a variety of forms. Since 1991 it has been conducted within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and since May of 1997 within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Cooperation within the framework of "Partnership for Peace" was an important result and part of this dialogue.

An important element of the process of "building bridges" to East-Central Europe is the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine. It has assumed a permanent institutionalized form. In May 1997, a decision was made to establish a permanent body called the NATO-Russia Council. It provides a forum for dialogue, without giving Russia the right to veto NATO's decisions. The dialogue with Ukraine is conducted within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.<sup>29</sup> These activities are of fundamental importance for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The culminating moment of the multidimensional political dialogue with East and Central European countries was the accession to NATO by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary on 12 March 1999,<sup>30</sup> which testifies to the democratic character of these countries and can be seen as a result of changes in the international order in Europe. However, it does not mean that the division of Europe has been moved further to the east. This is confirmed by the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, the institutional ties and cooperation between NATO and the countries of East-Central Europe, and the openness of the enlargement process.

Secondly, an important aspect of NATO's adaptive processes are "out of area" operations, undertaken outside the common defense area as defined in Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. Such a decision was taken in 1992. It was implemented twice: in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. The intervention in Kosovo, which was not based on the decisions of the UN Security Council, was undertaken on humanitarian grounds. It is generally believed that the motives underlying these actions had nothing to do with vested interests but with defending human rights. The intervention in Kosovo seems to confirm the rule that state sovereignty is gradually giving precedence to human rights in Europe. Both interventions have also contributed to increasing the stability of the international environment.

Thirdly, since the Rome Declaration of 1991, NATO has relied on the broad conception of security in its military, political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental dimensions and possible threats to each of them. This enforces a change of strategy and instruments used to safeguard security.

**b) Western European area.** It is organized around the European Union and the Western European Union. The discussion concerning the European pillar of NATO and the security and defense policy of European Union is a major element of its functioning. The character of the discussion has changed after the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, Western European countries began to undertake actions aimed at increasing their say in security and defense matters. An important problem, which emerged at that point, was the transformation of economic power into political power. On the other hand, the United States decided that "the new security must be based on stronger organizations of European integration."<sup>31</sup> This statement can hardly be regarded as unequivocal. Does it imply a gradual withdrawal from Europe, which seems unlikely and undesirable, or is it an expression of support for Western European identity and defense combined with an attempt at retaining control over this process?

Regardless of such dilemmas, there is political will in Western Europe countries to take a greater responsibility for their own security. The Maastricht Treaty elevated the Western European Union (WEU) to the status of the official defensive component of the European Union (EU). The WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 provided the basis for the WEU operations, envisaging the possibility of taking part in peacekeeping operations without the US participation. The Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994 made the decision about the development of "separable but not separate" European military capabilities that could be employed by the WEU in preventing local or regional conflicts. This enhances the autonomy of

Western Europe and constitutes the basis of actions aimed at regional stability.

To accomplish this task, the WEU has its own armed forces which include the Eurocorps, consisting of 50 thousand German, French, Dutch, and Spanish soldiers; Eurofor – a Mediterranean unit, Euromarfor – a navy unit stationed in Italy. These activities are a part of a broader process of the formation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).<sup>32</sup> All this leads to the development of the idea of the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI) and Europe's increased responsibility for its own security and regional stability.<sup>33</sup>

The European Union Summit in Cologne (June 1999) decided to incorporate the WEU into the EU, and during the European Council meeting in Helsinki (December 1999) it was decided to form a rapid reaction force and a deployment by 2003 of European military forces of up to 60 000 persons.

These decisions are an important part of the process of implementing the idea of the European Security and Defense Identity, increased capability for military action outside of NATO, and, consequently, greater political autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. The operation in Kosovo, undertaken in the spring of 1999, accelerated these developments. It demonstrated the gap between the United States and Western Europe in military technology and the capability of undertaking military operations. According to Z. Brzezinski, it also revealed that the US-Western Europe alliance is not a partnership of equals, because Western Europe is "in fact a military protectorate of the United States".<sup>34</sup>

The impact of the above actions undertaken by Western Europe on the transatlantic relations and ties requires further study. The answer to the question about whether these processes can lead to a growing independence of the security of the United States and the security of Europe is particularly important. Is it likely that the transatlantic ties will evolve in keeping with the new realities, whereas their durability will remain intact?

Changes taking place in the European Union indicate that political integration poses the most difficult problem, exacerbated by the lack of a clearly defined external threat. There are even conceptions of restricting political integration to some selected members of the present EU. The implementation of this conception might produce a Europe of "uneven pace of integration" and "changing geometry" and lead to new divisions. It also means that the end of the Cold War and the need of political integration have clearly changed the context of integration processes within the EU. The success of economic integration during the Cold War period, when the Soviet bloc threatened Europe, can hardly be repeated.

It must be emphasized that integration processes within the EU constitute a new quality in the functioning of the international environment. According to J. Fischer, German Foreign Minister, they lead to the replacement, or even elimination, of the balance of power principle, characteristic of the Westphalian system of international relations.<sup>35</sup> Although that principle was used to stabilize the international environment, there were cases of war waged to restore the balance of power. In this context, integration processes are an important element of change in the international environment, conducive to its stability.

**c) The Central European area.** Passing over political and historical controversies regarding the concept of Central Europe, I assume that it denotes the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, except the former German Democratic Republic and the former USSR. It is an area of radical changes of internal political, economic, and social order as well as changing international ties. On the one hand, the processes taking place in the area stimulate a change of the international order in Europe, and, on the other, they are a result of the transformations. Thus, the area is characterized by change and search for stability. Since the majority of states in the region are oriented towards the West, in accordance with the "all roads lead to the West" formula, they aspire to join NATO and the European Union.

Hence certain forms of regional cooperation seem temporary as their only function is to prepare its members for full membership in the above mentioned institutions. This holds true especially of the Visegrad group. Other structures such as the Central European Initiative or the Council of the Baltic Sea States do not comprise Central European countries alone.

In the long run, particular Central European countries will join the Western European area. This is confirmed by the Polish, Czech and Hungarian membership in NATO or the negotiations of 12 countries, including 10 from Central and Eastern Europe (after 1998, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and after 1999, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) on joining the European Union. However, the process of accession to the EU will not be easy. What is important is not only the readiness of these countries to join the EU, but also the readiness of the EU to admit new members. In this respect, particularly important is the introduction of institutional changes in the EU, enabling it to adopt decisions and undertake effective action, when its membership rises to 25-30 countries. Such changes are worked upon by another Inter-Governmental Conference which began in February 2000.

Apart from institutional reforms, a major obstacle of the EU expansion process, despite declarations to the contrary, consists in the immediate interests of EU members and the activities of various pressure groups. As a result, new candidates for membership have to

face greater demands in the negotiation process than those faced by Greece, Spain and Portugal when they were admitted to the EU. Thus, the admission of the first Central and Eastern European countries is unlikely to take place before 2005. Nevertheless, according to J. Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, the expansion of the EU is necessary, because in the long run Europe will not be able to bear two different principles of security. For him, the persistence of the principle of integration in Western Europe and the balance of power principle in Central and Eastern Europe is not conducive to the stability of Europe as a whole.<sup>36</sup>

The process of admission of Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union is an important element of the changing international order in the post Cold War Europe. It also involves a gradual process of expanding the area of stability and prosperity. As a result, the region will at some point cease to be a distinct area of institutional ties.

**d) The Community of Independent States area.** The area comprises the former Soviet republics, except Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Community of Independent States provides the political basis of institutional ties. On the level of security and defense, a fundamental role is played by the Tashkent Treaty of May 1992. It is an area of immense political, economic, and ethnic instability, and the cause of security risks for other European countries.

**e) The OSCE area.** It encompasses 55 states and is the only organizational structure comprising the area from Vancouver and San Francisco to Vladivostok. The origins of this organization date back to the Cold War period, when a political dialogue between the two parts of the divided Europe was initiated in the seventies. The Helsinki Final Act (1975) defined the principles of coexistence in the divided Europe. The end of the Cold War initiated the process of adapting the then CSCE to the new realities of international environment. The establishment of permanent bodies began which led to the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE on 1 January 1995. The definition of common values in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe turned the OSCE into a structure supervising the coexistence in the integrating Europe.

The OSCE in the post Cold War Europe is an element of the mechanism of mutually complementary and overlapping institutions, alongside NATO, WEU, UE, the Council of Europe, or the UN. Here, the structure of international order in Europe rests on a comprehensive and multidimensional (military, political, economic, humanitarian, social, and ecological dimensions) conception of security, and the cooperative approach to actions aimed at its protection. It "specializes" in the humanitarian dimension of security, and so undertakes actions aimed at protecting human rights, promoting democratic institutions, and protecting freedom of the

media. Other areas of the OSCE's activities include arms control, as demonstrated by the CFE, development of confidence-building measures, and stimulation of economic and environmental cooperation.

A particular place in the activities of the OSCE is occupied by preventive diplomacy, connected mainly with the prevention of ethnic conflicts. This is effected by the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the early warning system and monitoring missions.<sup>37</sup> These activities are an essential element of the international order in Europe and make a major contribution to the stability of the turbulent international environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.

### **III. The level of non-governmental actors**

The analysis of international order in the post Cold War Europe cannot be limited to states and their interaction. It is necessary to take into account non-governmental actors. Their development is a reflection of the general rule of international relations consisting not only in the quantitative rise in the number of participants but also in the deepening of their differentiation.<sup>38</sup> This means that, despite the unquestionable domination of states, a parallel structure of political interaction emerges, resulting from actions undertaken by decentralized, local actors functioning across state borders. R. Lipschutz termed this phenomenon a global civil society.<sup>39</sup> J. Rosenau writes about sovereignty-free actors.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, H. Bull described the process of the emergence of non-governmental actors as the new Middle Ages<sup>41</sup>, and M. Shaw wrote about entering the period of post-interstate international relations, where non-governmental actors should not be perceived as "intruders in the international environment".<sup>42</sup> This means that its state-centric structure is supplemented by a non-state, transnational structure.<sup>43</sup> In this context, J.N. Rosenau wrote about the process of the subjective bifurcation of the structure of actors in the international environment. The process is an important element of change in the international order in the post Cold War Europe.

Non-governmental actors undertake actions aimed at stabilizing the international order in Europe. They are an important source of information about processes taking place in the Euro-Atlantic area, in particular in connection with problems of human rights and environmental protection. They are involved in extensive cooperation with the High Commissioner for National Minorities. They also provide assistance in developing civil societies in such countries as Georgia, Kirgistan and Uzbekistan.

The Charter of European Security adopted in Istanbul in November 1999 stated that non-governmental organizations could play a vital role in promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. They are an integral part of strong civil societies.

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International order in the post Cold War Europe is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. It encompasses common values, negotiated norms of conduct and institutional ties. It includes elements of the continuity of solutions from the Cold War period, and elements of radical change. The stability of international environment is its manifest goal. It is also significant that international order in Europe cannot be analyzed only from the state-centric perspective, even though it is the dominant one. It is necessary to take into account non-governmental actors.

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- <sup>1</sup>. The present paper is a result of research conducted as part of an individual grant of the Vice-Rector of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in connection with a research project entitled "The mechanism of stabilizing international environment in the post Cold War Europe".
  - <sup>2</sup>. See J. Kukułka, "Pojęcie i istota międzynarodowego ładu pokojowego". [in:] *Problemy międzynarodowego ładu pokojowego*. Warszawa 1987, p. 10.
  - <sup>3</sup>. Ibid, p. 12-16; and J. Kukułka, "Na drodze do nowego ładu światowego". [in:] R. Kuźniar, ed., *Krajobraz po transformacji. Środowisko międzynarodowe Polski lat dziewięćdziesiątych*. Warszawa 1992, p. 197-198.
  - <sup>4</sup>. J. Kukułka, *Pojęcie..*, p. 16.
  - <sup>5</sup>. *Paryska Karta Nowej Europy*. Warszawa 1991.
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